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Update timekeeping.h #552

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@jjnetcn jjnetcn commented May 7, 2018

typo CLOCK_MONTONIC

@jjnetcn
Update timekeeping.h
19939ba 
typo CLOCK_MONTONIC
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Hi @jjnetcn!

Thanks for your contribution to the Linux kernel!

Linux kernel development happens on mailing lists, rather than on GitHub - this GitHub repository is a read-only mirror that isn't used for accepting contributions. So that your change can become part of Linux, please email it to us as a patch.

Sending patches isn't quite as simple as sending a pull request, but fortunately it is a well documented process.

Here's what to do:

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Firstly, all contributions need to be formatted as patches. A patch is a plain text document showing the change you want to make to the code, and documenting why it is a good idea.

You can create patches with git format-patch.

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fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2021
@intel-lab-lkp
Staging: rtl8723bs: fix spaces in HalBtc8723b2Ant.c
68e8707 
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl errors:

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#19: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:19:
    +static struct COEX_DM_8723B_2ANT * pCoexDm = &GLCoexDm8723b2Ant;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#21: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:21:
    +static struct COEX_STA_8723B_2ANT * pCoexSta = &GLCoexSta8723b2Ant;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#111: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:111:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#192: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:192:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#215: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:215:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_MonitorBtCtr(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#265: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:265:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_QueryBtInfo(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#282: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:282:
    +static bool halbtc8723b2ant_IsWifiStatusChanged(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#313: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:313:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_UpdateBtLinkInfo(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#315: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:315:
    +	struct BTC_BT_LINK_INFO * pBtLinkInfo = &pBtCoexist->btLinkInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#377: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:377:
    +static u8 halbtc8723b2ant_ActionAlgorithm(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#379: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:379:
    +	struct BTC_BT_LINK_INFO * pBtLinkInfo = &pBtCoexist->btLinkInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#552: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:552:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 dacSwingLvl

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#576: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:576:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 decBtPwrLvl

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#597: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:597:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, u8 decBtPwrLvl

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#631: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:631:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, u8 fwDacSwingLvl

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#666: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:666:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#689: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:689:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, bool bRxRfShrinkOn

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#723: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:723:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bLowPenaltyRa

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#751: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:751:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, bool bLowPenaltyRa

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #785: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:785:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_SetDacSwingReg(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u32 level)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#798: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:798:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bSwDacSwingOn, u32 swDacSwingLvl

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#809: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:809:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#853: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:853:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bAgcTableEn

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#913: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:913:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, bool bAgcTableEn

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#947: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:947:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#984: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:984:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#1050: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1050:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, u8 type

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#1099: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1099:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bEnable

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1120: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1120:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, bool bEnable

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1148: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1148:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1187: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1187:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1199: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1199:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1211: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1211:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 antPosType, bool bInitHwCfg, bool bWifiOff

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1214: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1214:
    +	struct BTC_BOARD_INFO * pBoardInfo = &pBtCoexist->boardInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1305: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1305:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, bool bTurnOn, u8 type

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1437: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1437:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_CoexAllOff(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1453: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1453:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_InitCoexDm(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1465: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1465:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionBtInquiry(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1493: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1493:
    +static bool halbtc8723b2ant_IsCommonAction(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1594: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1594:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bScoHid, bool bTxPause, u8 maxInterval

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2044: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2044:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionSco(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2099: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2099:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionHid(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2160: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2160:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionA2dp(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2241: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2241:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionA2dpPanHs(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2291: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2291:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionPanEdr(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2349: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2349:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionPanHs(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2399: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2399:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionPanEdrA2dp(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2460: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2460:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionPanEdrHid(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2524: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2524:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionHidA2dpPanEdr(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2584: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2584:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionHidA2dp(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2659: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2659:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_RunCoexistMechanism(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2758: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2758:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_WifiOffHwCfg(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2783: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2783:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_InitHwConfig(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bBackUp)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2817: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2817:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_PowerOnSetting(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2819: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2819:
    +	struct BTC_BOARD_INFO * pBoardInfo = &pBtCoexist->boardInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2869: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2869:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_InitHwConfig(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bWifiOnly)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2874: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2874:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_InitCoexDm(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2881: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2881:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_DisplayCoexInfo(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2883: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2883:
    +	struct BTC_BOARD_INFO * pBoardInfo = &pBtCoexist->boardInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2884: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2884:
    +	struct BTC_STACK_INFO * pStackInfo = &pBtCoexist->stackInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2885: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2885:
    +	struct BTC_BT_LINK_INFO * pBtLinkInfo = &pBtCoexist->btLinkInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3262: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3262:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_IpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3279: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3279:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_LpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3290: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3290:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_ScanNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3299: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3299:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_ConnectNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3308: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3308:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_MediaStatusNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3354: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3354:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_SpecialPacketNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3362: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3362:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 *tmpBuf, u8 length

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3506: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3506:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_HaltNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3517: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3517:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_PnpNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 pnpState)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3531: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3531:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_Periodical(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marcocesati@gmail.com>
fengguang pushed a commit to 0day-ci/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 16, 2021
@gregkh
Staging: rtl8723bs: fix spaces in HalBtc8723b2Ant.c
a178f0c 
This commit fixes the following checkpatch.pl errors:

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#19: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:19:
    +static struct COEX_DM_8723B_2ANT * pCoexDm = &GLCoexDm8723b2Ant;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#21: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:21:
    +static struct COEX_STA_8723B_2ANT * pCoexSta = &GLCoexSta8723b2Ant;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#111: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:111:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#192: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:192:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#215: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:215:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_MonitorBtCtr(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#265: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:265:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_QueryBtInfo(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#282: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:282:
    +static bool halbtc8723b2ant_IsWifiStatusChanged(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#313: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:313:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_UpdateBtLinkInfo(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#315: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:315:
    +	struct BTC_BT_LINK_INFO * pBtLinkInfo = &pBtCoexist->btLinkInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#377: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:377:
    +static u8 halbtc8723b2ant_ActionAlgorithm(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#379: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:379:
    +	struct BTC_BT_LINK_INFO * pBtLinkInfo = &pBtCoexist->btLinkInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#552: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:552:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 dacSwingLvl

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#576: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:576:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 decBtPwrLvl

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#597: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:597:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, u8 decBtPwrLvl

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#631: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:631:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, u8 fwDacSwingLvl

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#666: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:666:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#689: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:689:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, bool bRxRfShrinkOn

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#723: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:723:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bLowPenaltyRa

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#751: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:751:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, bool bLowPenaltyRa

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #785: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:785:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_SetDacSwingReg(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u32 level)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#798: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:798:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bSwDacSwingOn, u32 swDacSwingLvl

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#809: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:809:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#853: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:853:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bAgcTableEn

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#913: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:913:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, bool bAgcTableEn

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#947: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:947:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#984: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:984:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#1050: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1050:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, u8 type

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    torvalds#1099: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1099:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bEnable

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1120: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1120:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, bool bEnable

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1148: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1148:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1187: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1187:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1199: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1199:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist,

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1211: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1211:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 antPosType, bool bInitHwCfg, bool bWifiOff

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1214: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1214:
    +	struct BTC_BOARD_INFO * pBoardInfo = &pBtCoexist->boardInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1305: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1305:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bForceExec, bool bTurnOn, u8 type

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1437: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1437:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_CoexAllOff(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1453: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1453:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_InitCoexDm(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1465: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1465:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionBtInquiry(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1493: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1493:
    +static bool halbtc8723b2ant_IsCommonAction(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #1594: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:1594:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bScoHid, bool bTxPause, u8 maxInterval

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2044: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2044:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionSco(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2099: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2099:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionHid(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2160: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2160:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionA2dp(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2241: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2241:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionA2dpPanHs(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2291: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2291:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionPanEdr(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2349: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2349:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionPanHs(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2399: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2399:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionPanEdrA2dp(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2460: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2460:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionPanEdrHid(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2524: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2524:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionHidA2dpPanEdr(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2584: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2584:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_ActionHidA2dp(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2659: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2659:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_RunCoexistMechanism(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2758: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2758:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_WifiOffHwCfg(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2783: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2783:
    +static void halbtc8723b2ant_InitHwConfig(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bBackUp)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2817: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2817:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_PowerOnSetting(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2819: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2819:
    +	struct BTC_BOARD_INFO * pBoardInfo = &pBtCoexist->boardInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2869: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2869:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_InitHwConfig(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, bool bWifiOnly)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2874: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2874:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_InitCoexDm(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2881: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2881:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_DisplayCoexInfo(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2883: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2883:
    +	struct BTC_BOARD_INFO * pBoardInfo = &pBtCoexist->boardInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2884: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2884:
    +	struct BTC_STACK_INFO * pStackInfo = &pBtCoexist->stackInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #2885: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:2885:
    +	struct BTC_BT_LINK_INFO * pBtLinkInfo = &pBtCoexist->btLinkInfo;

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3262: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3262:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_IpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3279: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3279:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_LpsNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3290: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3290:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_ScanNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3299: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3299:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_ConnectNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3308: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3308:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_MediaStatusNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3354: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3354:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_SpecialPacketNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 type)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3362: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3362:
    +	struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 *tmpBuf, u8 length

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3506: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3506:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_HaltNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3517: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3517:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_PnpNotify(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist, u8 pnpState)

    ERROR:POINTER_LOCATION: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
    #3531: FILE: ./hal/HalBtc8723b2Ant.c:3531:
    +void EXhalbtc8723b2ant_Periodical(struct BTC_COEXIST * pBtCoexist)

Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Cesati <marcocesati@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210315170618.2566-5-marcocesati@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ojeda pushed a commit to ojeda/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 24, 2021
@wedsonaf
Merge pull request torvalds#552 from wedsonaf/pin-ref
e2df391 
rust: remove instances of `Pin<Ref<T>>`.
sean-jc added a commit to sean-jc/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 23, 2024
@sean-jc
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
1b96481 
Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicitly,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
sean-jc added a commit to sean-jc/linux that referenced this pull request Jul 23, 2024
@sean-jc
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
208371c 
Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
sean-jc added a commit to sean-jc/linux that referenced this pull request Aug 22, 2024
@sean-jc
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
4bcdd83 
Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 9, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
fc15786 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 9, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
a785ff9 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 10, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
1210afa 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 10, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
59c639c 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 10, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
98c172e 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 10, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
188ca1b 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
KexyBiscuit pushed a commit to AOSC-Tracking/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 10, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
71be1b3 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 11, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
25035eb 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
1054009064 pushed a commit to 1054009064/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 12, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
ecdbe8a 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
1054009064 pushed a commit to 1054009064/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 12, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
9393757 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
1054009064 pushed a commit to 1054009064/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 12, 2024
@sean-jc @gregkh
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
fa297c3 
commit 4bcdd83 upstream.

Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
yhamamachi pushed a commit to yhamamachi/linux-pcie-virtio-net that referenced this pull request Oct 23, 2024
@sean-jc @yhamamachi
KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS
ba7869a 
Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly
leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX
reads guest memory.

Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN
via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU.  I.e. trying to precisely use
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause
problems.  Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity,
grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by repro/1071:
  #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm torvalds#552
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0
  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
  nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel]
  load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm]
  ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm]
  ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0
  ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539
  </TASK>

Fixes: f7e5707 ("KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723232055.3643811-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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@jjnetcn @KernelPRBot